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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action rises out of the construction of a marina
on Callville Bay, Lake Mead, Nevada, Defendant/Respondent being
the owner and Marinas Internationale became the general
contractor on December 14, 1984 (Amended Findings of Fact
(Addendum D) "AF" paragraph 5).
(a)

On or about March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale,

the general contractor hired by Forever Living Products,
Defendant/Respondent, (hereinafter "FLP") entered into a
subcontract with Plaintiff/Appellant "Neilsen", entitled an
"Installment Contract", whereby "Neilsen" was to perform services
relative to the construction of the marina.
(b)

(AF paragraph 8).

The base dollar amount for the construction of the

marina per the general contract between "FLP" and Marinas
Internationale was $2,083,760.00.

The General Contract

(hereinafter "Contract", Addendum A) also contained a mechanism
whereby Marinas Internationale was to be paid an amount for
anchoring the dock system, based upon actual cost, but not to
exceed $101,740.00. After some storm damage occurred to the
project, a change order added an additional $26,713.00 to the
general contract amount.
(c)

(AF paragraph 6).

The Installation Contract between Marinas

Internationale and "Neilsen" required Marinas Internationale to
pay "Neilsen" $150,696.00 for the installation of the dock, which
was based on a price of $1.75 per square foot for 86,112 square
feet of dock and to install the roof for a price of $304,900.00.
2

(AF p a r a g r a p h 9 and Transcri pt " T " ••
{ ::i)

^- :-'":^.

"

Oi i ::: r a b o \ it M a r • :::1 1

- •..: . d e i I

IIi

contract between Marinas Internationale end Marina Mechanics was
issued requi ri ng Marina Mechanics to fabr icate and provide
certain anchor blocks oi 1 the marina at ai 1 add i tional cost I i»
Marinas Internationale of $41,211.00'.
:. '•

(AF paragraph 11).

Be gi'i ni :i i i lg ; n 1:1 l tl i> B or J gj n, a ] ::Ic:>\( jri payment i n

(e)

D e c e m b e r of 1 9 8 4 , a n d coi itinuing through February, M a r c h , Apri 1 ,
M a y -:rir- June 1 0 , 1 9 8 5 , "FLP" paid a 1: .otal of $2,109,168.50 _j
•;: e i: na t i o n a .1 e f o r iiia t e i: :i a 1 s !:: 1 ie ^ t ho u gh t h a d b e e i I
d e l i v e r e d to t h e site a n d for labor Invol ved In t h e construction
of t h e p r o j e c I:
(£)

(AF paragraph 1 2 ) .
Oi l oi about J \ n le 3 3

Il 985

lid J Liiidib

11 i t . e n i a l l u i u i I <'•:*

the general contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code.
(g)

(AF paragraph 1 3 ) .

Af ter tl: le bankr up l::c;y fi 1 ii lg, "Ne:i Ise i: i" i: e£i lsed t: : •

perforin further work unless some measures w e r e taken, t o ensure
p a y m e n t t ::) 1 i :i ni f • ::: r si id l M or 1 ::

Oi i Ji ine 211

] 985

a joi i l t:

accommodation was reached among "Nellsen ""' "FLP" and Marinas
Internationale whereby "Neilsen" would be paid by joint check
(payabJ e joi nt] ],< I: : "Nei ] sen11 and Mar i i las Inter nati oi la 1 e) base' i
u p o n time a n d m a t e r 1 a 1 1 nvo1ces submi11ed
and continue-: •
1-

"Ne11sen" proceeded

j e r f - ^ . work oi i this basis u n t i l A u g u s t 2 6 ,
.

(h)

or; cr about July 9, 1 9 8 5 , • a severe storm arose i n

the L a k e M e a d area a n d extensively damaged t h e m a r i n a , which w a s
3

still under construction at the time.
(i)

On or about August 26, 1985, "Neilsen" ceased

performing construction work in Nevada.
(j)

(AF paragraph 15).

On or about October 16, 1985, the Department of

Interior submitted a letter to FLP acknowledging completion of
the marina and giving its approval to open approximately one-half
of the marina slips at the Callville Bay Marina.

(AF paragraph

18).
(k)

On or about January 6, 1986, the Department of the

Interior, National Park Service submitted another letter to "FLP"
giving its approval to open the completed marina.

(AF paragraph

19).
(1)

"Astros" contract was with "Neilsen" to supply

steel structural materials for a roof structure over a portion of
the docks, such contract being entered into after "Neilsen"
contracted with Marinas Internationale.

(T Vol. 3, pp 135-147).

(ro) The original contract between "FLP" and Marinas
Internationale and the "Installation Contract" between "Neilsen"
and "FLP" contemplated third party beneficiaries. (AF paragraph
8).
(n)

"Astro" had no obligation, contractually or

otherwise, and did not do anything but supply materials to the
construction site.

"Astro" was a materialman only.

pp 135-147) .

4

(T. Vol 3,

ISSUES PRESENTED
(a) Whether Respondent has been unjustly enriched by
Appellants.

The trial court found insufficient evidence for

Neilsen1s unjust enrichment claim.

However, the record

substantiates that there is more than sufficient evidence to
support said claim and the Court erred in its judgment on this
issue.
(b) Whether "Neilsen", as a third-party beneficiary
under the terms of the lease entered into between "FLP" and the
Department of Interior or the contract referred to above is
subject to all defenses that could be raised! as against Marinas
Internationale.
(c) Whether or not the evidence supports a finding
that no oral agreements were made by "FLP" to Appellant
"Neilsen."
(d) Whether "FLP's" negligence in administering its
contract with Marinas Internationale resulted in damage
compensable to "Neilsen."
(e) Whether "Astro" was damaged by the negligence of
"FLP," other than economically, in "FLP's" Administration of its
contract.
(f) Whether "Astro," as a materialman only, "steps
into the shoes" of the contractor, or subcontractor and is
subject to all defenses "FLP" could raise as against a contractor
or subcontractor.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff/Appellant in this case, Ronald Neilsen
d/b/a Marina Mechanics (hereinafter "Neilsen), is asserting a
number of claims against the Defendant/Respondent Forever Living
Products (hereinafter "FLP").

First, Neilsen is arguing that FLP

was unjustly enriched by the work performed by Neilsen during the
initial contract period prior to the bankruptcy of Marinas
Internationale (hereinafter "MI"), for work performed during the
second contract period from June 13 through July 9, when a storm
damaged the construction project, and the third contractual
period of approximately July 12 through August 26, 1985 when
Neilsen was removed from the project,

FLP claims that it was

unjustly enriched because it paid the full contract price.
Neilsen asserts the full contract price was paid to the wrong
individuals and this improper payment was due to FLP's
incompetency and, therefore, the payment should not be considered
a defense,
Neilsen also argues that due to its third-party
beneficiary status it can recover against FLP.

The Court found

that Neilsen had third-party beneficiary status, but also found
that FLP could assert the liquidated damages delay provision of
the Contract against Neilsen and, therefore, Neilsen could
recover nothing.

Neilsen asserts that particular provision of

the contract should not be applied to him based on the
impossibility of performance which was created by FLP.

Neilsen

also asserts that FLP waived its right to assert the liquidated
6

damages provision by continuing to pay MI even though MI was in
breach of the completion date of the Contract.

Neilsen asserts

that the liquidated damage provision was waived by FLP under the
terms of the Contract, specifically paragrapjh 23.3 when it made
its final payment to MI on June 10, 1985. This waiver then would
preclude the assertion of the liquidated damages provision
against Nielsen or Astro Steel.
Neilsen also asserts that there wds an oral agreement
made between FLP and Neilsen to recoup Neils|en's losses to MI.
The Trial Court ruled that such an oral agreement was within the
Nevada Statute of Frauds and, therefore, precluded a finding that
Neilsen could recover.

Neilsen argues that the oral agreement

for recoupment of his losses was an inducement to have Neilsen
continue on the project and to see the project to completion.
Neilsen argues that part performance and FLP's inducement takes
the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds and would allow
Neilsen to recover his damages.
Lastly, Neilsen argues that he wa$ injured through
FLP's negligent administration of the contract.
that economic loss is not recoverable.

The Court found

However, Neilsen asserts

that the growing trend in cases of this natiire is to allow
recovery for economic loss and that under the circumstances of
this case, particularly with the language of the contract, it
would be appropriate.

7

ARGUMENT
I
DEFENDANT FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS WAS UNJUSTLY
ENRICHED BY THE WORK OF THE PLAINTIFF RONALD
NEILSEN D/B/A MARINA MECHANICS DUE TO FOREVER
LIVING PRODUCT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE PAYMENT FOR
THE WORK PERFORMED BY NEILSEN AND BY FAILING TO
TAKE ADEQUATE STEPS TO SEE THAT PAYMENTS MADE FOR
SAID WORK WERE PAID TO SUBCONTRACTORS AS REQUIRED
BY THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN FOREVER LIVING
PRODUCTS AND MARINAS INTERNATIONALE.
A.

INTRODUCTION

It has been urged by Defendant Forever Living Products
("FLP") that this case is a simple question of "a contractor
going bad" and leaving a subcontractor without payment.
Unfortunately, this matter is not that simple.

There are a

number of factors which complicate the contractual arrangement
and the issues. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, this
project, at least as far as Neilsen is concerned, involved three
separate contract terms.

The original written contract between

FLP and MI was essentially suspended on June 13, 1985 when MI
took out bankruptcy.

At that time, FLP reached an accommodation

with MI and Neilsen for the completion of the work.

There is no

indication that the terms of the original contract were ever
incorporated into the accommodation.

This occurred on or about

June 21, 1985.
Subsequent to the accommodation, the project was
severally damaged by a windstorm on Callville Bay.

This required

further modifications of any "contracts" that were in existence
8

at that time.

That effectively ended the second contractual

period and began the third contractual period with Neilsen being
paid on invoices submitted on a weekly basi$.

(T. Vol. II, pp

40-45).
Forever Living Products holds itself out to be a simple
customer seeking to have a project built and not receiving the
benefit of its contract.

What FLP fails to present is the fact

that on June 13, 1987 when MI filed for bankruptcy, FLP had
already breached the written agreement.
The written agreement required FLlf to meet a certain
payment schedule and to see that subcontractors were adequately
compensated (Addendum A) . Neither had takeiji place on June 10
when FLP made the final payment on the Contract (T. Vol IV, pp
121-145).

Based on the language of the Contract, subcontractors

had a right to rely on the terms of that agreement.

(Addendum

A).
In paying out the full amount und^r the Contract to
Marinas Internationale, in violation of the terms of the
contract, the subcontractors, specifically Neilsen and Astro
Steel, were injured.

FLP also breached the contract in allowing

MI to miss the scheduled completion dates of May 1 and June 1
without asserting its rights for liquidated damages.

In the

proceeding against it, FLP claimed that the liquidated damages it
failed to assert against Marinas Internationale should somehow
now be asserted against Neilsen and Astro Steel as third-party
beneficiaries.

From the testimony of Tom M^ce (T. Vol. IV, pp

121-45), it is clear that the only thing FLP was concerned about
was getting its marina completed; even if the completion, and the
means of accomplishing that goal, were detrimental to the rights
and obligations it owed to subcontractors.
B, FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED
BY THE WORK PERFORMED BY NEILSEN BOTH PRIOR AND
SUBSEQUENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY OF MARINAS INTERNATIONALE
AND PRIOR TO THE JOINT ACCOMMODATION,
1.

Legal Standard

The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, in effect, the
creation of a contract where none existed.

FLP insists that

Neilsen has no contractual rights against it under the agreement.
Neilsen asserts that he in fact does have certain rights under
the contract, but if this Court should rule that he didn't, the
doctrine of unjust enrichment would apply to the circumstances.
The legal standard for unjust enrichment has been clearly set out
by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Unionamerica Mortgage and
Equity Trust v. McDonald, 626 P.2d 1272 (Nev. 1981).

In the

Unionamerica case, the Court indicates that the purpose of this
kind of relief is to "do justice to the parties regardless of
their intention, Trollope v. Koerner, 470 P.2d 91 (1970)," at
1273.
In this case, Neilsen maintains that FLP's intent in
the original agreement was to confer benefits and protections
upon subcontractors.

However, even if that were not the intent

of the parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment would apply and
Neilsen can recover for work performed.
In the Unionamerica case, the Court, in citing Pass v.
10

Epplen,

424 P . 2 d 7 7 9 , 780 ( C o l o . 1 9 6 7 ) ,

saicil:

"The essential elements of quasi Contract are a
benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff,
appreciation by the defendant of $uch benefit and
acceptance and retention by the defendant under
circumstances such that it would be inequitable for
him to retain the benefit without payment of the
value thereof."
This can then be broken down into the four elements as
set forth above:

(1) A benefit to Defendant; (2) Appreciation

by the Defendant of the benefit; (3) Acceptance by the Defendant
of such a benefit; (4) Retention of the behefit under
circumstances that would be inequitable.

It is clear from the

standards as set forth by the Court that th^ factual
circumstances of each case will make the critical difference in
determining whether or not unjust enrichment has occurred and
whether Plaintiff can recover from said unjiist enrichment.
2.

Factual Standard.

As stated above, the Court must m&ke a factual
determination in each individual case to determine if the
equities require

recovery under the doctrihe of unjust

enrichment, see Costanso v. Stewart, 453 P.^d 526 (Ariz. 1969);
Paschall's Inc. v. Dosier, 407 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1966) and the
related discussions in 62 ALR 3rd 288.
In this case, the Appellant does not challenge the
trial court's findings of fact as to the claim itself because
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court's fihdings establish a
claim for unjust enrichment.

The Appellant does assert, however,

that the Court misapplied the facts to the 3-aw and therefore the
11

judgment and ruling must be reversed.
It is undisputed that Neilsen performed a substantial
amount of work on FLP's Callville Bay project.

It is also

undisputed that work was performed by Neilsen from March 11, 1985
through and including June 13, 1985, the date MI filed for
bankruptcy, (see Amended Findings of Fact paragraphs 10, 11 and
14) and subsequent to that date to August 26, 1985.
Defendant cannot assert that it was not enriched by the
work performed by Neilsen.

By June 10, 1985, fully thirty to

forty percent of the Marina installation had been completed.
This was not in compliance with the terms of the contract;
however, FLP made no assertions as to its rights under liquidated
damages provisions at that time or at any other time prior to
trial.

There is also no dispute that FLP appreciated the work

performed by Neilsen in that by June 10, 1985, FLP had in fact
paid out the full contract price to Marinas Internationale.

One

has to assume that FLP would not have paid out the contract price
had the work not been appreciated.

The key issue of dispute then

is whether or not FLP's failure to pay the amount requested by
Defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 and invoices is
inequitable.
3. FLP's Retention of the Work Performed
By Neilsen Without Paying as Asserted by Neilsen
at Trial was Inequitable.
In this case, FLP has asserted that it was not unjustly
enriched in that it paid out the full contract price for the work
that was performed.

In fact, FLP asserts that it paid out more
12

than the full contract price for the work performed.

This may

normally be an adequate defense as to the folurth factor set out
in Unionamerica, but for the fact that FLP's payments were
improper and in violation of the terms of thle contractual
agreement.
As set forth earlier, FLP had an obligation to
subcontractors to see that payment was made.

FLP was also

obligated to a certain payment schedule in the agreement, and
based on the language of paragraph 20 in said agreement,
subcontractors had a right to rely on FLP's adherence to the
schedule.

By June 10, 1985, even though the work was only thirty

to forty percent complete and even though Ml was a full forty
days late in completing the project with absolutely no hope of
completing the project in the near future, #LP made the final
payment on the contract.

This in effect ended any possibility

that the subcontractors would ever receive payment.
This was done with the knowledge that the marina was
only thirty to forty percent complete.

FLP had an agent on site

who was verifying shipment of materials.

However, this agent

either failed to properly notify FLP or FLP ignored the fact
regarding completion.

Therefore, equities would dictate that

FLP, by failing to live up to its own payment schedule and
contractual obligations, did not merely "pay for the contract"
but rather over paid MI and failed to pay tfye appropriate
parties.

Because of its breach of obligations, FLP cannot assert

that payment has been made.

This makes no more sense than
13

allowing an individual to assert a defense against a creditor by
claiming that it paid to much to another creditor.

Therefore,

FLP has been unjustly enriched and Neilsen has been damaged as
set forth in his testimony and exhibits.

The Court's ruling on

this matter should be reversed and judgment entered for
Appellant.
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II
NEILSEN AND FOREVER LIVING PRODUCES ENTERED
INTO AN ENFORCEABLE ORAL AGREEMENT IN WHICH
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS AGREED TO PAY THOSE SUMS
DUE NEILSEN THAT WERE NOT PAID BY MARINAS
INTERNATIONALE AS REQUIRED UNDER THE CONTRACTS
AND CHANGE ORDERS.
On June 21, 1985, the Defendant FLp entered into an
accommodation with the Plaintiff Neilsen and MI. As part of this
joint accommodation, Neilsen was to remain on site and complete
the work that MI had failed to complete.

This accommodation

included an oral agreement by FLP to pay for the unpaid debts
owed by Marinas Internationale to Neilsen.

The evidence

regarding these items were testified to by Rjon Neilsen and are
contained in Volume 1 of the transcript, pages 84-92.
FLP has set forth that the oral promise to pay for
another is barred by the Nevada Statute of Frauds, N.R.S.
111.220.

It is true that the Statute of Frauds does apply to the

situation where one agrees to answer to that of another.
However, there are certain circumstances under which the Court
will remove the oral contract from the statute of frauds. In
this case, FLP used the oral agreement to rqpay losses as an
inducement to keep Neilsen on site and to eater into the
accommodation to continue work.
This period constitutes the second contractual period
involved in the project.

Neilsen did in fac^t rely upon the

statements made by FLP and agreed to the accommodation.
continued work on the project under the terms of the
15

He also

accommodation.
Nevada case law recognizes that, under the Statute of
Frauds, certain equities can be taken into account to prevent
inequitable results due to oral agreements.

In Zunino v.

Paramore, 435 P.2d 196 (Nev. 1967), the Nevada Supreme Court
indicated that an agreement normally required to be in writing
could be taken out of the Statute of Frauds if elements exist
which amount to part performance.

In a previous case, Harmon v.

Tanner Motor Tours of Nevada Ltd., 377 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1963), the
Court ruled that in that particular situation, if there was only
a promise to reduce an agreement to writing, it was insufficient
to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. The Court
went on further to indicate that part performance alone was also
insufficient to remove an oral agreement from the Statute of
Frauds.

However, the Court then ruled that a combination of the

promise to reduce to writing and part performance would be
sufficient to remove the oral agreement from the statute.
In the case before us, Neilsen testified he entered
into an oral agreement with FLP in which FLP would pay the sum
due from MI (see Exhibit 25, Addendum B) and would continue to
pay Neilsen to complete the Marina.

FLP agreed to reduce the

agreement to writing and did so as to the ongoing work.

Based

upon the agreements, Neilsen continued to perform work for FLP
until August 26, 1985.

This continued work clearly shows the

part performance both on the part of Neilsen and on the part of
FLP in furtherance of their oral and subsequent written
16

agreement.
In a later case, Schreiber v. Schrpiber, 663 P.2d 1189
(Nev. 1983), the Supreme Court of Nevada determined that part
performance alone would be sufficient to rembve the oral
agreement from the Statue of Frauds. FLP induced Neilsen into
the agreement to continue work by orally agreeing to pay for
expenses incurred that were due him from MarfLnas Internationale.
The other occurrence that would tajce an oral agreement
out of the Statute of Frauds is detrimental reliance upon
representations made by FLP.

Neilsen clearly stayed on the job

even though he could have left and perhaps had other paying
contracts.

He took FLP at its word and belifeved that the Company

would make up the losses suffered at the hands of MI. This
detrimental reliance is one more factor in removing the oral
agreement from the Statute of Frauds.

See Ajlpark Distributing

Company v. Poole, 600 P.2d 229 (Nev. 1979).
While it may be argued that FLP did nothing but remain
silent regarding its agreement to recoup loSiSes incurred by
Neilsen, the Nevada Court has ruled that sil|ence can be just as
crucial a factor as assent.

In fact, it stajted

that "... The principal is obligated to exercise due care and to
conduct himself as a reasonably prudent busilness person with
normal regard for the interest of others", Goldstein v. Hanna,
635 P.2d 290, 292 (Nev. 1981).
Careful review of the testimony presented in the
transcript will show that the trial court clearly erred in
17

determining that there was an oral agreement that was bound by
the Statute of Frauds.

The representations by FLP regarding the

repayment or recouping of losses from MI induced Neilsen to
remain upon a job to his detriment.

There was sufficient

testimony to establish the amount of damages owed under the oral
representation.

FLP's conduct clearly takes the oral agreement

out of the Statute of Frauds and creates an enforceable agreement
between the parties.
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Ill
NEILSEN, AS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY, IS
NOT BARRED FROM RECOVERY DUE TO THE BREACH OF
MARINAS INTERNATIONALE.
A.

NEILSEN IS NOT SUBJECT TO EVERY DEFENSE FLP
COULD ASSERT AGAINST MI.

FLP has correctly asserted the general rule in thirdparty beneficiary cases.

The Oklahoma Court in Britton v. Groom,

373 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1962) stated "a third-party beneficiary who
seeks to enforce a contract does so subject to the defenses that
would be valid as between the parties."

However, in Morelli v.

Morelli, 720 P.2d 704 (Nev. 1986), the Court, after citing
Britton v. Groom, determined that the general rule is not always
applicable.
In the Morelli case, a contract existed between an
individual and his former wife.

This contractual agreement

involved tuition for their minor child to attend college. The
former wife breached the agreement.
held that the child,

Howeve^, the Morelli court

upon reaching the age of majority, could

enforce the contract as the third-party beneficiary.

When the

father asserted the defense that was created by the former wife's
non-performance, the Court determined that $ince the former wife
was dead, it was impossible for her to perform that portion of
the contract and allowed the third-party beneficiary to enforce
the contract even though the defense of nonperformance or breach
was "available."
Therefore, in Morelli, the Court ^ound that the general
19

rule is not applicable in all cases.

If the party that was to

perform or the individual third-party beneficiary couldn't
perform the obligations under the contract, the general rule
cannot apply.

This impossibility to perform, in effect,

discharges that portion of the contract that is impossible to
perform.
In this case, it is clear that Astro Steel does not and
did not have the expertise to complete the project. Therefore,
it would be impossible for Astro Steel to perform the contract.
Any failure of performance is discharged by Astrofs impossibility
to perform and therefore the liquidated damages defense is not
available.
A similar argument holds true as to Neilsen.

Neilsen

could not perform on the installation contract due to a number of
breaches by FLP.

Under the terms of the contract, FLP had an

obligation to monitor the payments and the delivery of materials
to the site.

Due to FLP's failure to properly monitor delivery

and payment (testimony of Tom Mace, supra), Neilsen was unable to
complete the project.

Sufficient material to complete the marina

was never on site prior to the completion dates as set forth by
FLP.
Had FLP properly monitored the contract with its on
site agent, Neilsen may have been able to perform the contract
and not have lapsed into a delay situation.

This failure by FLP

made the contract impossible to perform and, therefore, the
defense raised by FLP is discharged and not applicable to the
20

third-party beneficiary Neilsen.
B.

NEILSEN IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES BECAUSE FLP WAIVED ITS RIGHTS TO
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES BY CONTINUING TO MAKE PAYMENTS
AFTER MI WAS IN BREACH OF THE CONTRACT.
1.

FLP Waived Its Rights to Assert the
Liguidated Damages Claus^.

In paragraph 2 3.3 of the Contract, the Contract
indicates that:
"The making of final payments shall constitute a
waiver of all claims by the customer except those
arising from (1) unsettled liens; 1(2) faulty or
defective work appearing after substantial
completion; (3) failure of the work to comply with
the requirements of the contract documents; or (4)
terms of any special warranties required by the
contract documents."
When FLP made the final payment to MI on Jurle 10, 1985, it waived
its rights to any of the liquidated damages pursuant to the terms
of paragraph 23.3.

It may be argued that the delay is a "failure

of the work to comply with the requirements of the contract
documents" but without specific language referring to delay,
Neilsen asserts that that provision of the qontract does not
apply.
While FLP may not have waived its liquidated damages
rights in writing, conduct can be just as important as any
written agreement.

In fact, the waiver can !easily be inferred

from the conduct of FLP in this situation.

At no time was any

testimony presented that FLP asserted any oi the clauses set
forth in paragraph 23.3 as to MI or any other party.

FLP made

its final payments and this conduct clearly puts it within the
confines of paragraph 23.3, see Udevco, Inc. v. Wagonerf 678 P.2d
21

679 (Nev. 1984).
Even if the provisions did not exist in the contract in
paragraph 23.3, an owner can implicitly waive its liquidated
damages rights by continuing to make payments and making the
final payment under the contract, E.V. Cox Construction Co. vs.
Brookline Associates, 604 P.2d 816 (Okla. App. 1979).

By its own

evidence, FLP paid out a substantial amount of money to MI after
MI was already in breach of the completion date provision.

There

is no evidence to suggest that FLP ever asserted its liquidated
damages right against MI let alone prior to making its final
payment.
2. FLPfs Conduct Interfered With Neilsen's
Ability to Perform on the Contract and Therefore,
FLP is Estopped From Asserting the Defense.
FLP was responsible for a number of obligations under
the contract.

FLP was responsible for monitoring the progress

and seeing that payments were made only under the schedule as
progress was made.

FLP's failure to monitor these correctly

prevented on-time deliver of steel and materials which, in turn,
interfered with Neilsenfs ability to finish the marina.
FLP *s payments were in breach of the contract and
removed all incentive of MI to fulfill the obligations of the
contract.

This in turn impeded Neilsen's ability to complete the

contract.

In that FLP contributed to the delay through its

conduct, it cannot assert that delay as a basis for collection of
damages, see Higgins v. City of Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192 (Utah
1981).

FLP should have been or was well aware of the delays and
22

made no attempts whatsoever to take corrective action.
Therefore, the liquidated damage clause should not be applied to
third-party beneficiaries.
C. FLP CANNOT ASSERT LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAIMS
SINCE THE CONTRACT WAS EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED
BY THE ACCOMMODATION REACHED ON JUNE 21, 1985 AND
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE COMPLETION
DATE REQUIREMENTS BECAME PART OF THE ACCOMMODATION.
As stated above, the parties FLP, MI and Neilsen
entered into an accommodation on June 21, 1985. As part of that
accommodation, FLP was to issue joint check^ to MI and Neilsen
based upon Neilsen1s weekly invoicing.

At ho time during the

testimony or trial of this case was any evidence presented that
the completion date requirements ever became part of that
accommodation.

Neilsen asserts that the accommodation became a

substitute for the contract without specific language regarding
completion dates and liquidated damages; therefore, those
provisions were no longer in effect and were unenforceable.
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IV
NEILSEN HAS BEEN INJURED BY FLP•S NEGLIGENT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT WITH MI.
FLP entered into a contract with MI and had a set
payment schedule contained within the contract.

In making the

payments through June 10, 1985, FLP breached the terms of its
agreement and negligently administered the contract to the
detriment of the subcontractors.

The losses experienced by the

subcontractors were economic losses, but Neilsen asserts that the
new trend in tort law is to allow recovery for economic loss
under circumstances such as these.
A. FLP OWED A DUTY TO NEILSEN, ASTRO STEEL
AND ALL OTHER SUBCONTRACTORS AND MATERIALMEN
TO ACT REASONABLY AND RESPONSIBLY.
The language in paragraph 20 of the Contract creates an
obligation to subcontractors.

In paragraph 20, the agreement

creates the duty to act reasonably and responsibly.

The entire

contract agreement, while not between Neilsen and FLP, clearly
contemplated the use of subcontractors.

In fact, paragraph 20

gives the owner the opportunity to refuse to allow certain
subcontractors to perform work.

This veto power creates even

more of an obligation between the subcontractors and the owners
than a usual contract.
This duty of due care is a standard tort requirement
for finding of negligence.

Normally, in order for finding of

negligence, the Court must find that there was a duty, a breach
of that duty, proximate cause and damages.
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This is true even

though the relationship comes out of a contractual relationship,
see Section 93 of W. Prosser, The Law of Toffts (4th Edition,
1971); D.C.R., Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company, ^63 P.2d 433 (Utah
1983); Meece v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah
1981); and Williams v. City of North Las Ve^as, 541 P.2d 652
(Nev. 1975).
In this case, Neilsen was injured due to FLPfs failure
to exercise the degree of care which a reasonable person would
have exercised under the same circumstances.

Specifically, FLP

negligently administered the contract by making payments to MI
when it knew MI to be in breach of the completion clause of the
contract and substantially behind in the woifk performed.

This

negligence continued when FLP made the final payment on the
contract while the work was only thirty to forty percent
completed.
B.

PRIVITY IS NOT NECESSARY FOR NEILSEN TO
RECOVER FOR ECONOMIC LOSS UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CA$E.

The Trial Court held that, without privity, Neilsen
could not recover under a negligence theory for economic loss.
This is not supported by the law of Nevada 9r of surrounding
states.

In the Williams case cited above, the Nevada Court found

that even though the injured party was a sttanger to the
contract, he could recover.

In addition, bd>th the courts of

Arizona and Colorado have determined that the contractual
obligation is not necessarily the requirement for recovery, see
Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. Ku^ak, 621 P.2d 313
25

(Colo. 1980); Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Wheeler, 663 P.2d 1041
(Colo. 1983); and Brown v. Martin Marietta Corp., 690 P.2d 889
(Colo. App. 1984).
The Idaho courts have perhaps taken this further in
ruling directly on the issue of privity and economic loss, the
Idaho court in State v. Mitchell Construction Company, 699 P.2d
1349 (Idaho 1985) specifically ruled that privity of contract is
not required in a contract action to recover economic loss.
This, combined with the D.C.R. case, indicates that the growing
trend among the courts is to bypass the privity requirement
particularly when dealing with subcontractors, contractors and
owners.
It may make good sense to require privity when a thirdparty stranger is injured only economically as a result of
negligence in the administration of a contract.
was not the case here.

However, that

Neilsen was not a stranger third-party.

He was a subcontractor that specifically had to be approved by
both the owner and MI.

This approval requirement may even have

created the privity Defendant/Respondent claims is necessary in
an economic loss negligence action.

However, Neilsen maintains

under the law of D.C.R., Williams and the other cases cited,
privity is no longer a requirement in contractor, subcontractor
or owner cases and respectfully requests the court to remand this
action for further hearing on the issue of negligence.

26

performing the actual work were properly paid as required by
paragraph 20 of the Contract.

Further, Neilsen performed

additional work after the accommodation agreement for which he
was not paid.

FLP claims that they paid an invoice amount;

however, the testimony does not support that they paid the full
amount of those invoices.
If Neilsen is a third-party beneficiary, which the
Trial Court found, he is not subject to all defenses that can be
raised by FLP.

FLP cannot claim that, due tjo Mi's failure to

meet the completion date, Neilsen should be barred from
collecting damages.

This is true for several reasons, not the

least of which is the fact that, by the time| FLP asserted any of
these claims, it was impossible for Neilsen !to complete the
project.

Also, FLP clearly waived its rights to assert the

liquidated damages provisions, both by its conduct in breaching
the contract and by making the final payment as provided for in
paragraph 23.3 of the Contract.
While the Trial Court felt that the oral agreements
between Neilsen and FLP were bound by the Stlatute of Frauds, they
clearly were not.

Actions by FLP and Neils4n both removed the

oral agreements from the Statute of Frauds.

The part performance

by Neilsen and FLP and the inducement by FLP to have Neilsen to
continue on the job were just such actions.

Both acting together

removed the oral agreements from the Statute of Frauds and render
them enforceable.

The question of damages under the oral

agreement was submitted by Neilsen and not controverted.
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C. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TESTIMONY TO
ESTABLISH FLP' S NEGLIGENCE IN ADMINISTERING
THE CONTRACT.
During the trial of this action, two experts testified
regarding FLP's administration of the contract,
102-149).

(T. Vol. 2 pp

In this testimony, both experts essentially agreed

that FLP's payment to MI prior to its completion of the work and
at the stake at which it had been completed were not proper.

At

the conclusion of the testimony that was presented, the Court
refused to allow further testimony regarding issues of damages
and ruled that the recovery under negligence for economic loss
was not appropriate.

Therefore, this Court should remand this

case to the Trial Court on the issues of the establishment of
damages of economic loss.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Neilsen has more than adequately set forth that this
case is not a simple contractor gone bad case. There were
numerous issues involved, including the questions of third-party
beneficiaries, unjust enrichment, negligence and oral contracts.
Neilsen has meet his burden on all of these issues.
As to the question of unjust enrichment, Neilsen
submits that it is FLP who made the mistake and cannot hide
behind its own incompetence in paying out the contract price to
MI while not properly supervising either the work or delivery of
materials.

Had FLP properly supervised its work, it would not

have paid out the amount of money it claims to have paid.
Rather, it would have seen that subcontractors who were
27

FLP's negligent administration of its own contract
resulted in a substantial loss to Neilsen and to others. FLP was
negligent in paying MI the full contract prilce when the marina
was only thirty to forty percent complete an^l not all materials
had been delivered to the site.
verify delivery and work.

FLP had an employee on site to

However, he faileld to do so. Under

the circumstances, the claim by FLP that privity is necessary for
recovery of an economic loss under a theory lof negligence is
incorrect.

The trend in the case law is to allow recovery where

there is a relationship even if that relatidnship does not amount
to privity.
Neilsen respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
Trial Court and enter judgment on the issues of unjust
enrichment, defenses to third-party beneficiaries and/or his oral
agreement with FLP.

As to the claim for negligence, Neilsen

respectfully requests this Court to remand t;he case for trial on
the issue of damages alone.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1988.

P. Gary Ferrero
Attorney for Ronald K. Neilsen
d/b/a Marina Mechanics
Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM "A" - CONTRACT BETWEEN MARINAS INTERNATIONALE & FOREVER
LIVING PRODUCTS - Plaintiff $ 2

i

SALKS «R)NTKXCT
{Contract No.

ite

i

BILLING INFORMATION
Ship to
Address

r o j c c t rlame p f i i i u n 1r» Rflv Mnrlnn
is tome r For**1vr^-r Ri»sO r ^-«
Idress

innn

MAVHHM

Hyw.

Lty Boulder <C L i t ^ a t e
USA
mn t r y

Nv.

•

•»

SHIPPING INFORMATION

RiHt.f » ? 0 7
2

ip

P n l l v m ^ ttny Mnrinn
•Hnv 1 0 0 Sf.nr B t .

City Lns! Vpfras
Country
HSA
Contact

R9nns

stat

* H**_

10
zi

P 89124

Phone(

)

PRODUCT
Marinas Internationale, Ltd. (Company) agrees to provide the following
materials and equipment according to the attached specifications ar-:
marina plan entitled
Cnllvillo Bav Marina - 12/7/84 (annrox.79.p00 S Q
ana in accordance with the WOKK AND UULIVIIRV SiCMMDULE.
PRICE
The Customer agrees to pay for the following according to the PAYMENT
JJCIIKBULE:
Product
Price
Floating Docks:
0
Laminated marina decking,
thickness to be
4 *
•Polyethylene pontoons,
freeboard to be 16"-17'
•Dock fender (specify)
°Polyurethane foam
"Bolts, cleats,
pile guides
°0ther necessary hardware,
per plan
$1,776,085.00
TotJal
fcj'Kjways ( s p e c i f y ) :
not i:ic1'j'!c»f!
Utilities:
not i n c l u d e d
113 f 7107q0
Other- A n c horint?
Assembly & I n s t a l l a t i o n
$307,675.00
included
Hoof T&ttnlcture per plan
TOTAL
F r e i g h t ( c i r c l e ) C.X»F.< C6F, F.O.p.
Cotwaon C a r r i e r , F . A - S . r C.0«D., a t
included
TOTAL
$2»08S.7C0.0fl
• • ' '

•

•'

•

<

1

1

and t a x e s
Concord. CA • Fl Myers. Ft • Chicago. It * St. toui* MO • Mew York. NY •
Australia • Bahrain • Hong Kong « Kuwait • Saudi Arabia * United Arab

-?-

Date

December 10, 198^

Project Name

Callvllle Bay Marina

WORK AND DELIVERY SCHEDULE
Delivery

Work
Materials begin to arrive at

30 days from contract execution

job site within
Detail design complete and
assembly begins

i<5 days from contract execution

Breakwater, C, D, and E piers
completed to allow for boat
rentals - (approx. 5/1 assuming
12/12/8*1 contract execution) MI portion only.

Does not

account for utilities
installation

150 days from contract execution

Pinal completion h acceptance

lHU) 'lays from contract execution

PAYMENT SCHEDULE
% Due

Amount Due

Upon These Conditions

$188,979-50

Initial deposit, Indicating execution

Materials:

lot

of contract

90*

$1,700,815-50

Due pur payment terms as materials
are delivered to Job site

Total

$1,889,795.00

-3-

Labor;
90X

$17*1,555.00

10%

$19,'U0.00

Due per terras as work In completed
Due upon final completion

$193,865.00

Total

Total amount of contract $2,01*3,760.00.
The Customer shall make progress payments to the Company as
follows: 10% down with order and Irrevocable {letter of credit In favor
of Marinas Internationale, Ltd. wlt;h authorized draws based on receipt
of materials and work* performed.

Tin- Custome|r will be Invoiced upon

the Contractor issuing purchase orders.

Howulver, payment shall be due
i

7 days after materials arrive on site or upon arrival at a mutually
agreed upon storage area, according to a stat ernent of values which will
be issued at the time contractor

1SMI»?S

purch)asc orders.

If payment is

•itlayed beyond ten (l'>) days of whrn due, tin contract price snail,
without prejudice to the Company's right to 1 mined J ate payment, be
Increased by 1 1/2% per month on the- unpaid balance, but not to exceed
the maximum amount permitted by law.

Owner cigr^cs to provide bank

references and/or financial statements as Company may require.

All

prices quoted are valid for ninety (90) days]
5.

DELAYS
The Company shall be excused for. delay., in performance due to any f

cause "beyond Its control, Includingtout''hot''limitedto fire, flood, act*
of God, war, act of government, act *or .orpflaslon of Customer, strlke^orj
The time of performance sfiall be extended for a time F

labor trouble.
.

,

.

.

.

.

;.*.*•?..

equal to the period of the delay and It^^ri^equences.

— *-

6.

TITLE AMU INSURANCE
Title to the products and risk of loss or damage shall pass to

Buyer upon tender of delivery, except that a security Interest In the
product or any replacement shall remain In Company, regardless of mode
of attachment to realty or other property, until the full price has
been paid In cash.

Buyer agrees to do all acts necessary to perfect

and maintain said security Interest, and to protect Company's Interest
by adequately Insuring the product(s) against loss or damage from any
external cause with Company named as Insured or co-Insured.

Marinas

Internationale agrees to pay the deductible for any such claims,
7

-

STOJRAGJE COSTS
Any part of the marina product which must be stored due to delay

caused by the Customer will be placed in storage by the Company at cost
and risk to the Customer
8.

WARRANTY
The Company warrants to the Customer that the following materials

supplied by the Company will be free from defects under normal use and
service for a period of five (5) years from date of installation:
fender, foam, bolts, cleats, anchoring guides, and a ten (10) year
warranty on the pontoons.

Company will furnish, repair or replace

without cost to the Customer any part, assembly or portion thereof
which shall be determined to be defective.

The laminated plank carries

a 30 year limited warranty against decay which Is provided by the
manufacturer of the preservative treatment.

The Company provides a 5

year warranty against defects in the laminated plank provided

recommended maintenance Is I'ol |nw<nl.
r ncnrnrnendod ma 1 n tenanre details).

(See Specifications for
The Company provides a 5 year

warrant,v on the roof materials and design.

Other, separately listed

Items swrh as utilities products and components, gangways, pilings and
other accessories shall be covered only by t ie express warranty of the
I'lanufniMiirer or

supplier thereof.

Thp Compapy will not be responsible

Vov conspquent la] or incidental damages.
•).

IJLIJALTY

Company agrees to accept penalty clause of $800.00 per day,
Ml,000,00 pop wepk for* delays t ri meeting performance schedule In
accordance with paragraph l^ of ^nnl rnrl, "DELAYS" .
10.

SECURITY INTEREST
The Company reserves and the Customper igrants to the Company a

Security Interest In the marina materials a?|d all proceeds thereof for
the purpose of securing the balance of payments due under this
Contrart.

The Customer agrees to sign any financing statements which

the Company deems reasonably necpssary to protect tills Security
Interest.

The Company Is also granted an irrevocable power of attorney

to execute such financing statements on the Customer's behalf.

This

Security Interest shall terminate when the Customer has satisfied all
of Its obligations under this Contract.

Customer agrees to provide and prepare a suitable assembly site
for construction according to specifications to be provided by Company
This site will Include utilities and any special use permits, if
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needed .
12 . SHORESIDE COSTS
Customer agrees to assume shoreslde and bulkhead preparation costs
associated with installation, Including utility services and gangway
assembly.
13.

CHANGE ORDER
Design alterations after (Purchaser's) approval of final pier and

utility configuration will be done only through written change order.
(Purchaser) may submit a request for change order detailing anticipated
or desired alteration.

Marinas Internationale will then inform the

Purchaser of the Impacts, If any, of the proposed alteration on the
cost and schedule of materials delivery.

Acceptance, in writing, of

these by (the Purchaser) will constitute an approved change order and a
contract modification.
IH.

SALES CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT
The Company and the Customer agree to the following additional

contract terms and details:
a.

Customer to provide adequate security and Is responsible for

loss due to theft or vandalism.

Company is responsible for loss due to

damage during shipping, assembly and Installation.
b.

Customer to provide electricity and lighting necessary to

assemble during nighttime If needed to complete marina on schedule.
c.

Gale Brlmhall or other personnel as approved by Customer to

perform monthly on-site Q.C. inspection during installation.
d.

Company agrees to provide Customer the marina anchoring system
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at cost In an effort to save money.

The price of $113f710.00 is

Customer's estimated cost of the anchoring and agrees to pay to the
Contractor any additional costs over $113,710.00 up to the amount of
$215,450.00.

Contractor agrees to pay for any Anchoring costs over

$215,^50.00.
e.

The contract price of $2,083,760.00 is based upon Customer

providing materials and services which are listed In letter from K.
Larson to R. Ham dated 10/16/84. Company will allow further agreed
upon deductions if Customer can provide additional materials or
services to Company.
15.

MARKETING SUPPORT
Company to provide marketing support and Assistance to Customer

include:
. National Park Service presentation
. Display dock and pictures for use in sales
of slips
. A color rendering of project to be used
for promotion and sales
• Reasonable on-site assistance and braining
to assist Customer in meeting their marketing
objectives.
16•

UTILITY DESIGN
Company agrees to prlvlde complete utility designs and

specifications to Customer for its use in requesting quotations.
Company agrees to cooperation with utility corttractor in expediting
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utlllty Installation.

GENERAL CONDITIONS

Marinas Internationale Is herein known as COMPANY and/or CONTRACTOR.
Forever Resorts Is herein known as CUSTOMER and/or OWNER.

17.

CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement with General

Conditions, Supplementary and other Conditions, the Drawings, the
Specifications, accepted alternates and all Modifications after
execution of the Contract such as Change Orders, written
interpretations and written orders for minor changes in the Work.

The

intent of the Contract Documents is to include all items necessary for
the proper execution and completion of the Work.

The Contract

Documents are complementary, and what is required by any one shall be
as binding as if required by all.

Work not covered in the Contract

Documents will not be required unless it is consistent therewith and
reasonably Inferable therefrom as being necessary to produce the
intended results.
17.1

Execution of the Contract by the Company is a representation that

the Company has visited the site and is familiar with the local
conditions under which the Work is to be performed.
17.2

The Work comprises the completed construction required by the

Contract Documents and Includes all labor necessary to produce such
construction, and all materials and equipment incorporated or to be
incorporated in such construction.
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18 • CUSTOMER
If the Company falls to correct defective Work or persistently
fails to carry out the Work In accordance with the Contract Documents,
the Owner, by a written order, may order the Company to stop the Work,
or any portion thereof, until the cause for such order has been
eliminated; however, this right of the Customer to stop the Work shall
not give rise to any duty on the part of the Owner to exercise this
right for the benefit of the Contractor or any other person or entity.
19.

COMPANY
The Company shall supervise and direct the Work, using the

Company's best skill and attention, and the Company shall be solely
responsible for all construction means, methods], techniques, sequences
and procedures and for coordinating all portions of the Work under the
Contract.
19.1

Unless otherwise specifically provided in the Contract Documents,

the Company shall provide and pay for all labor, materials, equipment,
tools, construction equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilities,
transportation, and other facilities and services necessary for the
proper execution and completion of the Work, whether temporary or
permanent and whether or not incorporated or toj be incorporated in the
Work.
19.2

The Company shall at all times enforce strict discipline and good

order among the Company's employees and shall not employ on the Work,
any unfit person or anyone not skilled in the task assigned to them.
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19.3

The Company warrants to the Customer that all materials and

equipment incorporated in the Work will be new unless otherwise
specified, and that all Work will be of good quality, free from faults
and defects and In conformance with the Contract Documents.

All Work

not conforming to these requirements may be considered defective.
19.*4

The Company shall give all notices and comply with all laws,

ordinances, rules, regulations, and lawful orders of any public
authority bearing on the performance of the Work, and shall promptly
notify the Owner if the Drawings and Specifications are at variance
therewith.
19.5

The Company shall be responsible to the Customer for the acts and

omissions of the Company's employees, Subcontractors and their agents
and employees, and other persons performing any of the Work under £
contract with the Company.
19.6

The Company shall review, approve and submit all Shop Drawings,

Product Data and Samples required by the Contract Documents.

The Work

shall be in accordance with approved submittals.
19.7

The Contractor at all times shall keep the premises free from

accumulation of waste materials or rubbish caused by the Company's
operations.

At the completion of the Work the Company shall remove all

such waste materials and rubbish from and about the Project as well as
bhe Company's tools, construction equipment, machinery and surplus
naterials.
L9.8

The Company shall pay all royalties and license fees; shall

lefend all suits or claims for infringement of any patent rights and
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shall save the Owner harmless from loss on account thereof.
19.9

To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Company shall

Indemnify and hold harmless the Customer and hl^ agents and employees
from and against all claims, damages, losses ana expenses, Including
but not limited to attorney's fees arising out of or resulting from the
performance of the Work, provided that any such claim, damage, loss or
expense (1) is attributable to bodily Injury, sickness, disease or
death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than
the Work itself) Including the loss of use resulting therefrom, and (2)
is caused in whole or in part by any negligent gLCt or omission of the
Company, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by
any of them or anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable. Such
obligation shall not be construed to negate, abridge, or otherwise
reduce any other right or obligation of indemnity which would otherwise
exist as to any party or person described in this paragraph 19.9 in any
and all claims against the Customer or any of his agents or employees
by any employee of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly
or Indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for whose acts any of
them may be liable, the indemnification obligation under this Paragraph
19.9 shall not be limited in any way by any limitation on the amount or
type of damages, compensation or benefits payable by or for the
Contractor or any Subcontractor under Workers1 Or Workmen1s
Compensation Acts, disability benefit acts or other employee benefit
acts.
19.10

Company to accept responsibility for wages, workman's
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:ompensation, insurance, etc, a3 necessary for all personnel it
mployees while performing assembly and Installation.

Customer agrees

o cooperate, if possible and without risk, to any assistance to
ompany it can provide relative to conforming with State of Nevada
ontract and labor requirements.
0.

SUBCONTRACTS
A Subcontractor Is a person or entity who has a direct contract

Lth the Contractor to perform any of the Work at the site.
).l

Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents or in the

.ddlng Documents, the Contractor, as soon as practicable after the
rard of the Contract, shall furnish to the Owner in writing the names
' Subcontractors for each of the principal portions of the Work.

The

ntractor shall not employ any Subcontractor to whom the Owner may
ve a reasonable objection.

The Contractor shall not be required to

ntract with anyone to whom the Contractor has a reasonable objection,
ntracts between the Contractor and the Subcontractors shall (1)
quire each Subcontractor, to the extent of the Work to be performed
the Subcontractor, to be bound to the Contractor by the terms of the
itract Documents, and to assume toward the Contractor all the
Ligations and responsibilities which the Contractor, by these
juments, assumes toward the Owner and (2) allow to the Subcontractor
? benefit of all rights, remedies and redress afforded to the
ttractor by these Contract Documents.
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21.

WORK BY CUSTOMER OR BY SEPARATE CONTRACTORS
The Customer reserves the right to perform1 work related to the

Project with the Customer's own forces, and to award separate contracts
in connection with other portions of the Project or other work on the
site under these or similar Conditions of the Contract.
21.1

The Company shalL afford the Customer and separate contractors

reasonable opportunity for the introduction andj storage of their
materials and equipment and the execution of their work, and shall
connect and coordinate the Contractor's Work unjder this Contract with
theirs as required by the Contract Documents.
21.2

Any costs caused by defective or ill-time|d work shall be borne by

the party responsible therefor.
22.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
The Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the

Project is located.
23.

PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION
Payments shall be made as provided in 4. df the Agreement.

23.1

Payments may be withheld on account of (1) defective Work not

remedied, (2) claims filed, (3) failure of" the Contractor to make
payments properly to Subcontractors or for labor, materials or
equipment, (*J) damage to the Owner or another Contractor, or (5)
persistent failure to carry out the Work In accordance with the
Contract Documents.
23*2

Final payment shall not be due until the Contractor has delivered

to the Owner a complete release of all liens arising out of this
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Contract or receipts in full covering all labor, materials and
equipment for which a lien could be filed, or a bond satisfactory to
the Owner indemnifying the Owner against any lien.

If any lien remains

unsatlslfled after all payments are made, the Company shall refund to
the Customer all monies the latter may be compelled to pay in
discharging such lien, including all costs and reasonable attorney's
fees .
The making of final payment shall constitute a waiver of all

23*3

claims by the Customer except those arising from (1) unsettled liens,
(2) faulty or defpctive Work appearing after Substantial Completion,
(3) failure of the Work to comply with the requirements of the Contract
Documents, or (4) terms of any special warranties required by the
Contract Documents.

The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a

waiver of all claims by the Contractor except those previously made in
writing and identified by the Contractor as unsettled at the time of
the final Application for Payment.
24.

PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
The Company shall be responsible for initiating, maintaining, and

supervising all safety precautions and programs In connection with the
Work.

The Company shall take all reasonable precautions for the safety

of, and shall provide all reasonable protection to prevent damage,
injury or loss to (1) all employees on the Work and other persons who
may be affected thereby, (2) all the Work and all materials and
equipment to be incorporated therein, and (3) other property at the
site or adjacent thereto.

The Company shall give all notices and
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comply with applicable laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and orders
of any public authority bearing on the safety of persons and property
and their protection from damage, injury or loss.

The Contractor shall

promptly remedy all damage or loss to any property caused in whole or
In part by the Contractor, any Subcontractor, and Sub-sub-contractor,
or anyone directly, or by anyone for whose acts any of them may be
liable, except damage or loss attributable to the acts or omissions of
the Owner or anyone directly employed by him or by anyone for whose
acts either of thern may be liable, and not attributable to the fault or
negligence of the Contractors.
2H.

CHANGES IN THE WORK
The Owner, without invalidating the Contract, may order changes in

the Work consisting of additions, deletions, or modifications, the
Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time being adjusted
accordingly.

All such changes In the Work shall be authorized by

written Change Order signed by the Owner.
21.1

The Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time may be

changed only by Change Order.
24.2

The cost or credit to the Owner from a phange In the Work shall

be determined by mutual agreement.
25.

TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT
If the Contractor defaults or persistently fails or neglects to

carry out the Work In accordance with the Contract Documents or fails
to perform any provision of the Contract, the Owner may, after 30 day's
wrlten notice to the Contractor, make good such deficiencies and may
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deduct the cost thereof from the payment then or thereafter due the
Contractor or, at the Owner's option that sufficient cause exists to
justify such action, may terminate the Contract and take possession of
the site and of all materials, equipment, tools, and construction
equipment and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may finish
the Work by whatever method the Owner may deem expedient; and If the
unpaid balance of the Guaranteed Maximum Cost, If any, exceeds the
expense of finishing the Work, such excess shall be paid to the
Contractor, but If such expense exceeds such unpaid balance, the
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner.
26.

ACCOUNTING RECORDS
The Contractor shall check all materials, equipment and labor

entering into the anchor/winch system and shall keep such full and
detailed accounts as may be necessary for proper financial management
under this Agreement.

The Owner shall be afforded access to all the

Contractor's records relating to this anchor/winch system*
2 7.

SPECIFICATIONS
Company agrees to provide all materials In accordance with Its

published materials specifications sheet, copy attached,
28.

ENTIRE CONTRACT
This Contract, including the SAL$S CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT where

applicable, constitutes the entire Contract between the Customer and
the Company regarding the purchase of the marina materials noted above*
This contract supercedes any prior written or oral agreements.

This

Contract may only be amended by a written instrument executed by both
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partles

Marinas Internationale, Ltd,

By:

tfm

Date
By:

By

Date:

Date

MUL

WLA*J

:

f/w

Customer warrants that the
specifications and marina plan have!
been approve^ and are herewith
attached.

(initial)

ADDENDUM "B" - MARINA MECHANICS' REQUEST FOR PAYMENT #6-Plaintiff's
25

8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 840^2
(801) 942-1832
REQUEST FOR PAYMENT # 6

D'tr;

TO: MARINAS INTERNATIONALE LTD.
457A Carlisle Drive
Herndon, VA. ??070
ATTEN: Tom Allgyer

RF: J03 #A10l-Nev.

C o n t r a c t Re:

C ^ l l v i l l c Bny M?rin-=t/Lake Me?ri, Nevada
$1501696.00
^OL 900.00
101 580.00
i.l[?11.00
7/^l/.V7
$67? 701.59

DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT:
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASF CONTRACT:
ANCHORING BASE CONTRACT:
AMENDMENT # 1 BASE CONTRACT: (ANCHOR)
BACKCHARGFS (TO 6-17-85)
TOTAL CONTRACT TO DATE:
MOBILIZATION
Dock Assembly
20,000.00
Ro>f Assembly
-0Anchorine
10,000.00
Amendment # 1
5,000.00
Backcharges
-0Totsl Contract to D.He ^5,000.00
Work Comolrtr to D^tr T5,000.00
Net Invoice to Date
35,000.00
Less Previous Payments^,OOP. 00)
Duo This Invoice

-0-

M^-ke Check P r y a b l r t o ; MARINA
Sincerely,
MARINA MECHANlCS^piT.

Ronald K. N e i l s \
Owner
RKN/gn

6-1P-85

MATERIAL

Labor

LI ,5/6. 00
?/0,300. 00
LIS?). 00
^0,70?. 00
1? t ^0?./0|
°07,i5P.?d
(17^,198.8Q)

89,170.00
6/ ,600.00
n,7?0.00
5,£01.?0
6?,017.19
?bl , 9 3 ^ 9
l?O t )2?. 0 ?
190,52^.39
(7/., 79 5.??)

1:0,696.00
''O/ ,900.00
101,900.00
/1,211.00
7 / ^ 1 / . 59
67? ,701. ,9
5°?,975.59
5°?,975.59
(?8?,99/.Q?)

1°/,?5"V-Cj

115,7?8.17

2 / 9 , 9 9 ; . 57

°07,i ,?.rd

MFCHANICS ENT.

Tot^l

ADDENDUM "C" - FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586)
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and
ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation (Intervenor),
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF
CONCLUSIONS
DEFENDANT'S
INVOLUNTARY

FACT AND
OF LAW RE:
MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL

vs.
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant.

Case No. C85-6367
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

This matter came on regularly before the court for a nonjury trial on June 9, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
District Judge, presiding; Edwin T. Peterson of Maddox &
I
Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. ^eilson, dba Marina
Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter "Neilsojn"); J. Ray Barrios
of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for plaintiff
intervenor Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter "Astro"); and

George A. Hunt and Ryan E. Tibbitts of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living Products,
Inc., (hereinafter

H

FLP H ); and the plaintiff and plaintiff

intervenor having adduced evidence by way of testimony and
documentary exhibits and having argued the matter to the court,
and the court having reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda
submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the premises, and the defendant having moved for involuntary dismissal
of the claims of plaintiff and intervenor pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 41(b) and the court having considered arguments of
counsel, and good cause appearing, now, therefore, the court
hereby makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Ronald K. Neilson is an individual residing

in the State of Utah and doing business as Marina Mechanics,
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff Intervenor, Astro Steel Corporation, is a

Utah corporation in good standing with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
3.

Defendant, Forever Living Products, Inc., is an

Arizona corporation registered to do business in the State of
Utah, and doing business in, among other locations, the State
of Nevada.
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4.

The claims of Neilson and Astro arose in the State of

Nevada.
5.

On December 12, 1984, a General Construction Contract

was entered between FLP and Marinas Internationale which
created a direct economic relationship between them.
6.

None of the parties have adduced any evidence proving

that FLP intentionally interfered with the contractual
relations between Marinas Internationale and Neilson.
7.

All damages suffered by Neilson and Astro as shown by

the evidence adduced in this action are purfely economic in
nature.
8.

No damage to persons or property has been proved.
The only evidence adduced by plaintiff to support a

claim for damages for breach of oral contract is that FLP
promised to "recoup Neilson*s losses.-

Such representations,

if made, constitute a promise by FLP to answer for a debt of
Marinas Internationale.
9.

No promise was made by FLP to Astrp to pay the balance

due Astro by Marinas Internationale.
10.

Neilson failed to pay the workman'^ compensation pre-

miums required by Nevada law long before Marinas Internationale
declared bankruptcy on June 13, 1985.

The failure to make
i

these required payments was the sole cause of Neilson being
forced to leave the Callville Bay Marina construction site and
to cease construction work in the State of Nevada.
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11.

All the work performed by Neilson after July 9, 1985,

pursuant to the arrangement between the parties, was paid for
in full by FLP pursuant to invoices submitted by Neilson.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court draws the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The State of Nevada is the state with the most

significant relationship to the transactions here in question.
Therefore, Nevada law applies.
2.

FLP had a significant financial interest and its own

contractual relationship which justified any interference with
the Neilson-Marinas Internationale Installation Contract.
3.

The economic losses suffered by Neilson and/or Astro

are not recoverable and do not support a claim of negligence.
4.

Any oral promises made by FLP to Neilson are barred

pursuant to the applicable statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 111.220 (1986), as promises to answer for the debt of another.
5.

The evidence adduced is too vague and indefinite to

support the finding of an oral contract between the parties to
this action.
6.

Defendant's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal should be

granted against both plaintiff and intervenor in accordance
herewith and an appropriate Judgment of Dismissal entered.
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DATED this

day of August, 19817.

Timothy R. Hanson
District C^ourt Judge
SCMCLERK17
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STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Lynn Frear, being duly sworn, says that she i s employed in the
law o f f i c e s of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for

herein; that she served the attached

defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

(Case No. C 8 5 - 6 3 6 7

S a l t Lake

County) upon the parties

l i s t e d below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed t o :
J . Ray B a r r i o s
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN
777 Clark Learning O f f i c e C e n t e r
175 South West Temple
i
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8410][
Denver C. S n u f f e r
MADDOX & SNUFFER
64 E a s t 6400 S o u t h , S u i t e
Murray, Utah 84107

120

HAND DELIVERED
and causing the same t o be marri«eti7 fix bcnrl7resr"PP?ra^Er prepaid 7 on the
3 1 s t day of

July

, 1987
**—
LynftFj
Lynn
Frear

% /LL0SLs

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3lst day of

July

19_S7
My commission expires:
7//^/iff

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in S|alt Lake County, Utah

ADDENDUM "D" - AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586)
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and
ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation (Intervenor),

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant.

Case No. C85-6367
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

This matter came on regularly before the court for a nonjury trial on June 9, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
Utah State District Judge, presiding; Edwin T. Peterson of
Maddox & Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. Neilson,
dba Marina Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter "Neilson"); J.
Ray Barrios of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for
plaintiff intervener Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter
"Astro"); and George A. Hunt and Ryan E. Tibbitts of Snow,

Christensen & Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living
Products, Inc., (hereinafter "FLP"); and the parties having
adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary exhibits
and having argued the matter to the court, and the court having
reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda submitted by the
parties and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing, now, therefore, the court hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On April 29, 1982, FLP entered into a Concessionaire's

Lease with the United States of America, Department of the
Interior to act as a concessionaire on United States government
property.

This property is located at Callville Bay in the

Lake Mead National Recreation area, within the State of Nevada.
2.

Paragraph 20 of the Department of Interior Lease pro-

vided the United States Secretary of the Interior with the
option of requiring a completion bond for any construction work
performed on their leased Callville Bay property.
3.

The United States Secretary of the Interior did not,

at any time, require a completion bond for any work relating to
the Callville Bay Marina.
4.

The only third party benefits claimed by Neilson and

Astro under the Department of Interior lease were those allegedly provided under paragraph 20 of the lease.
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5.

On December 14, 1984, FLP entered into a General

Construction Contract with Marinas Internationale, a Virginia
corporation, for construction of a marina on Callville Bay,
Lake Mead, Nevada.
6.

The base dollar amount for the construction of the

marina per the General Contract between FLP and Marinas
Internationale was $2,083,760.00.

The General Contract also

contained a mechanism whereby Marinas Internationale was to be
paid an amount for anchoring the dock system, based upon actual
cost, but not to exceed $101,740.00.
7.

The General Contract between FLP and Marinas

Internationale provided that the marina was to be completed no
later than June 12, 1985.
8-

On March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale entered into

a subcontract with Neilson, entitled "Installation Contract",
whereby plaintiff was to perform services relative to the construction of the marina.
9.

The Installation Contract between Marinas

Internationale and Neilson required Marinas Internationale to
pay $150,696.00 for the installation of the dock, which was
based on a price of $1.75 per square foot for 86,112 square
feet of dock.

The Installation Contract further required

Neilson* s work to be completed by May 31, 1985, incorporated by
reference the provisions of the contract between FLP and
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Marinas Internationale, and required Neilson to be bound
thereby.
10.

On March 11, 1985, Neilson began to perform as subcon-

tractor at Callville Bay in the assembling and construction of
the marina's floating dock system.
11.

On March 28, 1985, a change order to the contract

between Marinas Internationale and Neilson was issued requiring
Neilson to fabricate and provide certain anchor blocks on the
marina at an additional cost to Marinas Internationale of
$41,211.00
12.

Beginning with the original down payment in December

of 1984, and continuing through February, March, April, May and
to June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $2,109,168.50 to Marinas
Internationale for materials and labor involved in the construction of the marina.
13.

On June 13, 1985, Marinas Internationale, the general

contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.

FLP had no prior knowledge or warning

of this action.
14.

After the bankruptcy filing, Neilson refused to

perform further work unless some measures were taken to ensure
payment to him for such work.

On June 21, 1985, a joint

accommodation was reached among Neilson, FLP, and Marinas
Internationale whereby Neilson would be paid by joint check
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(payable to Neilson and Marinas Internationale) based upon time
and material invoices to be submitted.

Neilson proceeded and

continued to perform work on this basis until August 26, 1985,
when he was ousted from the project for nonpayment of State
insurance fees.
15.

On July 9, 1985, a severe storm arose in the Lake Mead

area and extensively damaged the marina, vhich was still under
construction at the time.
16.

On July 15th, FLP met with Neilson and discussed storm

damage repair work.

Prior to the storm, FLP had paid a total

of $52,132.70 in joint checks to Marinas Internationale/
Neilson.
17.

On August 26, 1985, Neilson was ordered to cease per-

forming construction work in Nevada by the State Industrial
Insurance System of Nevada for nonpayment sof insurance premiums.

Thereafter, the remaining marina construction and storm

damage repair work was completed by FLP using its own work
forces.
18.

On October 26, 1985, the Department of the Interior

acknowledged completion and gave approval to open approximately
one-half of the slips at the Callville Bay marina.
19.

On January 6, 1986, the Department of the Interior,

National Park Service, acknowledged completion of and qave its
approval to open the completed marina.
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20.

FLP suffered significant economic loss in the form of

additional project completion expenses and lost profits from
slip rentals and other sources.
21.

In addition to payments for storm damage repair, FLP

paid the following amounts for the construction of the Marina:
$2,109,168.50

52,132.70

Total of joint checks paid prior to the
storm of 7/9/85

70,000.00

Paid to Jessop Bros. Construction Co.
for erection of Marina roof.

36,000.00

Paid by FLP to B&C Steel for the final
truck load of steel.

$2,267,301.20

22.

Total of checks paid to Marinas
Internationale prior to the bankruptcy
filing.

Total paid by FLP for completion of
Marina, exclusive of payments for storm
damage.

The agreement between FLP and Marinas Internationale

contained provisions for the benefit of materialmen such as
intervenor Astro Steel and such persons were intended third
party beneficiaries of said contract.
23.

The damages sustained by Astro Steel which are

supported by the evidence amount to the sum of $101,300.00,
together with prejudgment interest thereon.
24.

Pursuant to the provisions of the agreement between

FLP and Marinas Internationale, FLP is entitled to liquidated
damages thereunder for late/noncompletion of the marina
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construction project, which, together with the economic loss
set forth in Finding of Fact 20 (above), more than offset the
damage sustained by Astro Steel.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court draws the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A binding contract existed between defendant FLP and

the United States Department of Interior.
2.

A binding contract existed between FLP and Marinas

Internationale.
3.

A binding contract existed between Marinas

Internationale and Neilson.
4.

Any rights and/or obligations which existed between

FLP and Neilson were covered by express written agreements
which preclude any recovery by Neilson based upon a theory of
unjust enrichment.
5.

The record contains insufficient evidence for the

court to determine damages attributable to a claim of unjust
enrichment by Neilson.
6.

FLP paid a substantial sum for completion of the

Callville Bay marina and therefore has not been unjustly
enriched by either Neilson or Astro.
7.

Under the terms of the Installation Contract, Neilson

agreed to assume all the obligations that Marinas Internationale
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had to FLP.

The defenses and liquidated damages available to

FLP under the General Contract excuse FLP from any performance or obligation to Neilson as a third party beneficiary and
preclude any recovery by Neilson.
8.

Both Neilson and Astro, by claiming third party bene-

ficiary status, assume the rights and obligations of Marinas
Internationale and subject themselves to all defenses available
to FLP under the terms of the General Contract.

Marinas

Internationale is in material breach of the General Contract
entered into with FLP.
performance.

FLP is thereby excused from any further

Therefore, neither Neilson nor Astro may recover

as third party beneficiaries to the general contract.
9.

The liquidated and other damages available to FLP

under the general contract offset any third party benefits
claimed by Astro.
10.

Defendant should be awarded a judgment in its favor

and against both plaintiff and intervenor in accordance
herewith.
DATED this

/
day of September, 1987.

'iraothy R. Hanson
'District Court Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
MUELLER, BARRIOS S. CHRISTIANSEN

By
J. Barrios
Attorneys for Intervenor
MADDOX S. SNUFFER

By
Edwin T. Peterson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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